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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the number of precedential opinions issued by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit regarding veterans affairs
remained low, and again the Federal Circuit's focus remained
predominantly on matters of procedure and jurisdiction rather than
substantive veterans benefits law. Significantly, only one of the
* Partner, Ropes & Gray LLP, Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Associate Professor,
American University Washington College of Laur J.D. 2003, Harvard Law School; B.A.,
Mathematics 2000, Dartmouth College. Mr. Schoenhard served as a law clerk to the
Honorable Arthur J. Gajarsa of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
teaches "Patent and Trademark Appeals Before the Federal Circuit" and "Veterans
Affairs Law" at American University Washington College of Law, and is the author of
VETERANs AFFAIRS LAw (Carolina Academic Press 2012). He can be contacted by
email at schoenhard@gmail.com.
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Federal Circuit's twelve precedential opinions' in this area represents
a decision in favor of a veteran.'
Recent articles in this area have focused on the actual or potential
impact of the changing composition of the Federal Circuit on
veterans law.' In 2015, the Federal Circuit saw its latest addition, as
the Honorable Kara F. Stoll joined the court to fill the seat vacated by
the Honorable Randall Rader, who retired in June 2014. Although
Judge Stoll is not the first Federal Circuit judge with experience in
the field of veterans affairs, this may be the first time that a judge on
the Federal Circuit has both appeared on behalf of a veteran and
adjudicated a veteran's claim in the same calendar year. While still in
private practice, Judge Stoll represented the veteran appellant in
Delisle v. McDonald,4 which is discussed below.
I. JURISDICTION OVER VETERANS BENEFITS APPEALS
Since the passage of the Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988,'
veterans and their survivors have enjoyed an entitlement to appeal
adverse veterans benefits decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims ("Veterans Court") and to further appeal the
1. The Federal Circuit issued non-precedential decisions or terminating
orders in sixty-six appeals from the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
during the same period.
2. Carter v. McDonald, 794 F.3d 1342, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Federal
Circuit also decided three additional appeals in favor of claimants, albeit in non-
precedential opinions. See Palmatier v. McDonald, 626 F. App'x 991, 994 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Jackson v. McDonald, No. 2014-7088, 2015 WL 3461914, at *7 (Fed. Cir. June
2, 2015); Salberg v. McDonald, 610 F. App'x 973, 978 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
As discussed further below, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the
Veterans Court's decision in Wingard v. McDonald, 779 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
which would tend to be interpreted as a win for the veteran appellant, but the
opposite is the case. On remand, the Veterans Court was instructed to dismiss the
claimant's appeal for lack ofjurisdiction. Id. at 1359.
3. See, e.g., Victoria Hadfield Moshiashwili, Ending the Second "Splendid Isolation"?:
Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2013, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 1437, 1447-48 (2014) ("In
2011, three judges left the court, two assumed senior status, and three new judges
were confirmed."); James D. Ridgway, Changing Voices in a Familiar Conversation about
Rules vs. Standards: Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2011, 61 AM. U. L. REv. 1175,
1177-80 (2012) (commenting that the Federal Circuit has experienced a significant
change in composition after years of maintaining "relative stability"); James D.
Ridgway, Fresh Eyes on Persistent Issues: Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2012, 62 AM.
U. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (2013) (asserting that the addition of newjudges could lead to
"unexpected outcomes in areas that previously may have seemed settled").
4. 789 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
5. Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
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decisions of that court to the Federal Circuit.' This entitlement,
however, has consistently been confounded by limitations placed on
the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. Specifically, pursuant to 38 U.S.C.§ 7292, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review decisions of
the Veterans Court "with respect to the validity . .. of any statute
or regulation . .. or any interpretation thereof."' But the court
does not have jurisdiction to review questions of fact or the
application of law to fact.'
In 2015, the Federal Circuit dismissed thirty-three appeals from the
Veterans Court for lack of jurisdiction.' In other words, the Federal
Circuit assumed jurisdiction over only forty-five-or fifty-eight
6. Id. § 4052, 102 Stat. at 4113; id. § 4092, 102 Stat. at 4120.
7. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (2012).
8. Id. § 7292(d) (2); see, e.g., Waltzer v. Nicholson, 447 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (declaring that precedent establishes that the Federal Circuit is withoutjurisdiction to consider whether the weight of evidence in fact meets the legal
standard required in a specific case).
9. Smithers v. McDonald, 626 F. App'x 1011, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam); Williams v. McDonald, No. 2015-7105, 2015 WL 8773799, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
Dec. 15, 2015) (per curiam); Thornton v. McDonald, 626 F. App'x 1007, 1008 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Cleaver v. McDonald, 622 F. App'x 911, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(per curiam); Newgard v. McDonald, 628 F. App'x 754, 757 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam); Gabriel v. McDonald, 621 F. App'x 1024, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam); Schellinger v. McDonald, 627 F. App'x 918, 918, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Shoemake v. McDonald, 615 F. App'x 954, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam);
Andrus v. McDonald, 615 F. App'x 950, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Hulsey v.
McDonald, 625 F. App'x 546, 549 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Philippeaux v.
McDonald, 612 F. App'x 615, 616-17 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Jeremiah v.
McDonald, 609 F. App'x 644, 645-46 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Scotto v.
McDonald, 620 F. App'x 913, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Lawson v.
McDonald, 618 F. App'x 670, 674 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Delisle, 789 F.3d at 1374; Bejarano
v. McDonald, 607 F. App'x 994, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Thomas v.
McDonald, 614 F. App'x 513, 516 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Williams v. McDonald, 614 F.
App'x 499, 503 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Hall v. McDonald, 607 F. App'x 991,
992 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Guajardo v. McDonald, 607 F. App'x 985, 987
(Fed. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 598 (2015); Rodriguez v. McDonald,
611 F. App'x 715, 719 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Bell v. McDonald, 604 F. App'x
932, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Swearingen v. McDonald, 603 F. App'x 1005,
1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Vetter v. McDonald, 599 F. App'x 386, 386 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Vann v. McDonald, 606 F. App'x 1005, 1009 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Keel v. McDonald, 602 F. App'x 522, 524 (Fed. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2332 (2015); Wohlwend v. McDonald, 595 F. App'x 989, 991 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Smith v. McDonald, 602 F. App'x 516, 518 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam);
Ervin v. McDonald, 594 F. App'x 687, 688 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Bowers v. McDonald, 594
F. App'x 684, 685 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Macak v. McDonald, 598 F. App'x
776, 780-81 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Kelly v. McDonald, 592 F. App'x 949, 950
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Fullmer v. McDonald, 589 F. App'x 537, 538 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (per curiam).
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percent-of the seventy-eight veterans appeals that the court resolved
in 2015. And of those, seven appeals were dismissed in part.'o
In Delisle v. McDonald, a panel of the Federal Circuit, comprised of
Chief Judge Sharon Prost, Judge Alan D. Lourie, and District Judge
Rodney Gilstrap," dismissed the claimant's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction because the appeal presented only questions of fact or
the application of law to fact.12 Specifically, the appeal concerned a
request for an increased rating for Mr. Delisle's right knee disability,
which the Veterans Court determined fell within established
diagnostic codes ("DCs")."
Interestingly, despite dismissing the appeal, the Federal Circuit
proceeded in dicta to discuss a legal issue raised by Mr. Delisle.14
Specifically, the Federal Circuit rejected Mr. Delisle's argument that DC
5257 is a catch-all regulation that would entitle him to an increased
rating.15 The legal argument did not, however, vest the Federal Circuit
with jurisdiction over Mr. Delisle's appeal because the Veterans Court
had already determined that application of DC 5257 to the facts of Mr.
Delisle's claim would not entitle him to an increased rating."6
10. Mathis v. McDonald, 725 F. App'x 539, 542 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam);
Clay v. McDonald, 618 F. App'x 674, 677-78 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); El Malik
v. McDonald, 618 F. App'x 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Bryan v. McDonald,
615 F. App'x 681, 685 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Winsett v. McDonald, 611 F. App'x 710, 714
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam); Salberg v. McDonald, 610 F. App'x 973, 978 (Fed. Cir.
2015); Grayton v. McDonald, 597 F. App'x 1079, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
Although it has become a relatively common practice at the Federal Circuit,
"dismissal" of an issue is an imprecise way of declining to review an issue because
the court lacks jurisdiction to do so. This practice, however, highlights the Federal
Circuit's sensitivity to its jurisdictional constraints in veteran's appeals. See PAUL M.
SCHOENHARD, VETERANS AFFAIRS LAw 419 (2012) (discussing how the Federal
Circuit often imprecisely treats nonreviewability of an issue as dismissal of the issue
for lack ofjurisdiction).
11. Delisle, 789 F.3d at 1373. The Honorable Rodney Gilstrap of the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas sat by designation with the Federal Circuit in
April 2015.
12. Id. at 1374.
13. Id.
14. See id. ("Further, if the court were to reach the merits of Mr. Delisle's claim,
he cannot prevail.").
15. Id. at 1374-75. Note that the Federal Circuit's treatment of this argument
does not form a basis for dismissing Mr. Delisle's appeal, does not comprise a
holding, and does not represent precedent on the legal issue.
16. Id.; Delisle v. Shinseki, No. 12-3113, 2014 WL 718507, at *2 (Vet. App. Feb.
26, 2014), appeal dismissed, 789 F.3d 1372 (2015).
[Vol. 65:10591062
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In Wingard v. McDonald,'7 the Federal Circuit considered another
jurisdictional issue: whether 38 U.S.C. § 7252(b) precludes the
Veterans Court from reviewing a case if the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) complied with statutory constraints on the
schedule of disability ratings." The Federal Circuit expressly held
"that Congress has barred the Veterans Court from conducting that
review and also has barred this court from itself conducting the
review on appeal from a Veterans Court decision.""
Relatedly, the Federal Circuit explained that its authority to
review regulations on direct appeal from the VA pursuant to 38
U.S.C. § 502 did not permit it to take up the same issues indirectly
via the Veterans Court."
II. EQUITABLE TOLLING AND THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Henderson v.
Shinseki," holding that the deadline for a veteran to file a notice of
appeal to the Veterans Court is notjurisdictional. In so doing, the Court
left open the possibility that such filings could be subject to equitable
tolling." In the wake of Henderson, the Federal Circuit has issued four
precedential decisions, working with the Veterans Court to develop the
framework and boundaries for equitable tolling in this context 23
In Toomer v. McDonald,4 the Federal Circuit once again took up the
issue of equitable tolling in a case that the court had remanded twice
already for further review of equitable tolling considerations.2 1
17. 779 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
18. Id. at 1355.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1358-59.
21. 562 U.S. 428 (2011).
22. See id. at 438, 442 n.4 (clarifying that, in this case, the court expressed no view
on the question of whether the deadline for filing a notice to appeal is subject to
equitable tolling).
23. Toomer v. McDonald, 783 F.3d 1229, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Checo v.
Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373, 1378-81 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Dixon v. Shinseki, 741 F.3d 1367,
1375-79 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The
Federal Circuit's Checo and Dixon decisions are analyzed in Victoria Hadfield
Moshiashwili, The Downfall ofAuer Deference: Veterans Law at the Federal Circuit in 2014,
64 AM. U. L. REv. 1007, 1062-70 (2015), and the court's Sneed decision is analyzed in
Moshiashwili, supra note 3, at 1507-09.
Although not clarifying the scope of equitable tolling, the Federal Circuit has
also analyzed Henderson in Tyrues v. Shinseki, 732 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
24. 783 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
25. Id. at 1239. In 2011, the Federal Circuit remanded Mr. Toomer's original
appeal to the Veterans Court for further adjudication in view of Henderson. Toomer
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The Board of Veterans Appeals ("Board") claimed to have sent Mr.
Toomer its decision on his claim on June 2, 2009. What followed
was rather peculiar:
On July 27, 2009, however, Mr. Toomer informed the VA by
telephone that he had not yet received the Board Decision. He was
informed a decision had already been entered and another copy
would be mailed to him. On August 4, 2009, the VA mailed a cover
letter to Mr. Toomer with a date-stamp of "AUG 04 2009,". . .
[and] (1) a copy of the VA's [earlier] cover letter to Mr. Toomer
hand-dated "6/02/09," (2) a copy of the Board's June 2, 2009
decision, also hand-dated "6/02/09" with a stamped "FILE COPY'
over the signature block, and ... a notice of appellate rights . 2.. .7
Mr. Toomer filed his notice of appeal more than 120 days after
June 2, 2009, although he did so within 120 days of August 4, 2009.28 The
Veterans Court dismissed his appeal as untimely and twice reentered its
dismissal in the wake of remands from the Federal Circuit29
On appeal to the Federal Circuit for a third time, Mr. Toomer's
case was submitted to a panel comprised of Judges Jimmie V. Reyna,
Raymond C. Clevenger, and Evan J. Wallach. Judge Wallach wrote
the opinion for the court,so with Judge Reyna writing in dissent."
Judge Wallach's panel opinion focused first on whether Mr.
Toomer had rebutted the presumption of regularity that attached to
the VA's claim that it had, in fact, sent its original Board decision on
June 2, 2009.2 In particular, Judge Wallach addressed Mr. Toomer's
argument that the VA had a duty to provide him with additional
information regarding VA procedures, which he could use to rebut
the presumption of regularity." The Federal Circuit found that the
v. Shinseki, 424 F. App'x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). After Mr. Toomer's
appeal was again dismissed by the Veterans Court in Toomer v. Shinseki, No. 09-4086,
2012 WL 762844, at *2 (Vet. App. Mar. 12, 2012), the Federal Circuit again
remanded the case to the Veterans Court for further consideration of the evidence
and argument that Mr. Toomer had submitted regarding the presumption of
regularity. Toomer v. Shinseki, 524 F. App'x 666, 670-71 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
26. Toomer, 783 F.3d at 1231.
27. Id. (citations omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1231-32.
30. Id. at 1231.
31. Id. at 1240 (Reyna,J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1234 (majority opinion).
33. Id. at 1235.
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VA had satisfied its obligations in this regard and deferred to the
Veterans Court's analysis of the evidence.
Judge Wallach then addressed the Veterans Court's decision not to
apply equitable tolling in Mr. Toomer's case. In doing so, Judge
Wallach looked to the analytical framework endorsed by the Federal
Circuit in 2014 in Checo v. Shinseki," stating that "'to benefit from
equitable tolling,... a claimant [must] demonstrate three elements:
(1) extraordinary circumstance; (2) due diligence; and (3)
causation.' That is, due diligence must be shown '[i]n addition to an
extraordinary circumstance.' 3 6
Judge Wallach acknowledged that "equitable tolling is not 'limited
to a small and closed set of factual patterns,'"3 but concluded that
the Veterans Court "properly considered whether, in this case, Mr.
Toomer's claim that he was misled by a VA document constitutes an
extraordinary circumstance."" The Federal Circuit declined to revisit
further the Veterans Court's substantive analysis.
In dissent, Judge Reyna questioned the majority's reluctance to
review the Veterans Court's equitable tolling analysis as a matter of
law, noting that, in his view, no material facts were in dispute. 40 On
the merits, Judge Reyna would have found that equitable tolling was
appropriate. And, in his view, the Veterans Court's decision to the
contrary established a precedent that may produce undesirable, or
even "absurd," results in other cases."
III. OTHER PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The Federal Circuit also considered several appeals focusing on
procedural matters, including whether (1) notice errors may be
cured, (2) the VA can be found to violate its duty to assist when it
orders an additional medical examination that ultimately does not
34. See id. at 1236 ("[A]s to Mr. Toomer's evidence that the Board Decision he
received in the August 4, 2009 mailing was unsigned and hand-dated, the [Veterans
Court] acknowledged this may be 'some evidence that the original decision might
not have been finalized or mailed on June 2,' but 'does not rise to the level of clear
evidence of irregularity' .... ").
35. 748 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
36. Toomer, 783 F.3d at 1238 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Checo, 748 F.3d at 1378-79).
37. Id. at 1239 (quoting Mapu v. Nicholson, 397 F.3d 1375,1380 (Fed. Or. 2005)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1239-40.
40. Id. at 1240-41 (ReynaJ., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1241-43.
42. Id. at 1243.
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support the veteran's claim, (3) the Veterans Court has discretion to
deny motions to recall a prior judgment under "the Plan," and (4)
whether procedural arguments may be waived if not raised and
exhausted before the Board and/or the Veterans Court.
In Carter v. McDonald,43 the Federal Circuit considered the effect of
the Board's failure to provide proper notice of the deadline for
submitting new evidence pursuant to a joint remand from the
Veterans Court." Specifically, as part of the remand proceedings, the
Board sent a letter to Mr. Carter and his former representative, the
Disabled American Veterans, advising Mr. Carter that any additional
argument or evidence in his case "must be submitted ... within
[ninety] days of the date of this letter."45 The Board did not send the
letter to Mr. Carter's new counsel, and Mr. Carter's new counsel did
not receive the letter within the ninety-day period. 6 A copy of the
letter was, however, provided to Mr. Carter's new counsel as part of
Mr. Carter's claim file after the ninety-day deadline had passed, but
before the Board issued a decision in Mr. Carter's case.4 ' The Board
denied Mr. Carter's claim.
On appeal, the Veterans Court concluded that the Board's
inclusion of the notice letter in the version of the claim file provided
to Mr. Carter's new counsel cured the Board's error in failing to send
the letter to Mr. Carter's new counsel in the first instance.49
On further appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Carter's case was
submitted to a panel comprised of Judges Reyna, S. Jay Plager, and
Richard G. Taranto. Judge Taranto wrote the opinion for the court. 0
Importantly, the government did not dispute the Board's duty to
provide notice directly to the claimant's representative pursuant to 38
C.F.R. 1.525(d) . As a result, the Federal Circuit's focus remained
solely on whether Mr. Carter's counsel's general understanding of
procedure or the Board's subsequent provision of a copy of the letter
43. 794 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
44. Id. at 1342-43.
45. Id. at 1343 (emphasis omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1343-44.
49. Id. at 1344.
50. Id. at 1342.
51. Id. at 1345. Although the Federal Circuit does not appear to have addressed
the significance of this regulation in the past, the Veterans Court has consistently
treated the failure to provide notice to a claimant's representative pursuant to 38
C.F.R. § 1.525 as error. See, e.g., McGlaughn v. Nicholson, 23 Vet. App. 504, No. 04-
1218, 2007 WL 1659090, at *3 (May 31, 2007) (unpublished table decision).
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to Mr. Carter's counsel cured the Board's failure to provide timely
notice. As the panel held, neither cured the Board's error:
Without an additional notice, we do not see how the notice failure
could have been cured unless the applicable law itself
contemporaneously put Mr. Carter's counsel on notice that the
[ninety]-day letter could not be applied according to its
unambiguous terms, i.e., unless the law informed his counsel that,
despite the unambiguously stated deadline, Mr. Carter was legally
entitled to submit evidence past the deadline and have it
considered by the Board exactly as if it had been submitted before
the deadline. There was no such law.5 3
In the only precedential win for a veteran in 2015, the Federal
Circuit reversed the Veterans Court's decision and remanded Mr.
Carter's claim."
In Herbert v. McDonald,5 the Federal Circuit considered whether 38
U.S.C. § 5103A, which imposes on the VA a broad duty to assist
veterans in developing their claims, forbids the VA from ordering a
medical examination unless the existing record is found to be
insufficient." Writing for a panel consisting of Judges Timothy B.
Dyk, Taranto, and Todd M. Hughes, Judge Taranto provided the
following explanation:
The statute states that, in certain circumstances, the Secretary must
order a medical examination. It does not say, however, that the
Secretary may not order a medical examination in any other
circumstance. It imposes an evidence-gathering duty on the
Secretary. It does not confine discretion the Secretary otherwise has
to gather evidence, including by ordering a medical examination.5 7
The Veterans Court decision affirming the denial of benefits to Mr.
Herbert was thus affirmed.5 8
In Smith v. McDonald," the Federal Circuit considered the Veterans
Court's discretion in the implementation of the plan ("Plan") the
Federal Circuit established in National Organization of Veterans
Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,"o "requiring the
Department of Veterans Affairs ... to take certain actions to identify
52. Carter, 794 F.3d at 1345.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1347.
55. 791 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
56. Id. at 1366.
57. Id. at 1366-67.
58. Id. at 1367.
59. 789 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
60. 725 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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and rectify harms caused by its wrongful application of a former
version of 38 C.F.R. § 3.103."61 Importantly, in Smith, there was no
evidence that the invalid version of section 3.103 had at any point
been applied during adjudication of his claim." Nonetheless,
because Mr. Smith had not obtained full relief on his claim-because
his case was returned as a result for searches on "§ 3.103" and
"Bryant," and consistent with the Plan-the VA offered to file a
motion to recall the Veterans Court's decision in his case and to file a
motion for a joint remand of his claim for further adjudication. 3
The Veterans Court, however, denied both motions."
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, a panel comprised of ChiefJudge
Prost, Judge Plager, and Judge Wallach held that the Plan did not
impose any obligations on the Veterans Court.6 The Veterans
Court's decision was thus affirmed.'
In Scott v. McDonald,"7 the Federal Circuit considered whether
procedural objections that are not expressly raised and exhausted in
proceedings before the Board and/or the Veterans Court may be
deemed waived.' Specifically, this case invited the Federal Circuit to
relax its precedent regarding issue exhaustion and to clarify or extend its
past holdings regarding the duty of the Board to liberally construe
claimants' arguments and to consider related claims that are reasonably
raised by the record, even if not expressly raised by the claimant."
During proceedings at the VA, Mr. Scott requested a hearing
before the Board but was unable to appear at the scheduled time.7 0
Although Mr. Scott had informed the Board that he was incarcerated
and, therefore, unable to appear in person, the Board determined
that Mr. Scott's failure to appear was without good cause and refused
to provide him with a rescheduled hearing."
61. Smith, 789 F.3d at 1332. Section 3.103 outlines claimants' procedural due
process and appellate rights during U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
proceedings. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (2015).
62. Smith, 789 F.3d at 1333.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1334.
65. See id. at 1331, 1335 ("Neither the requirements of the Plan nor the language of
our decisions in the NOVA litigation bound the Veterans Court to automatically grant a
joint motion to recall or remand simply because such a motion was proffered.").
66. Id. at 1335.
67. 789 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
68. Id. at 1381.
69. See id. at 1377-78, 1380-81.
70. Id. at 1376-77.
71. Id. at 1377.
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Thereafter, Mr. Scott's claim was decided adversely on the merits.
He appealed to the Veterans Court, which granted him a remand,
and his claim returned to the VA." Mr. Scott did not, however,
expressly raise-either with the Veterans Court or with the Board on
remand-any procedural objection to the Board's refusal to
reschedule his original evidentiary hearing.74
When Mr. Scott ultimately pressed his objection, during a second
appeal to the Veterans Court, the Veterans Court determined that
the argument had not been properly raised and exhausted at the
agency level and was thus waived."
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Mr. Scott's case was submitted to
a panel comprised ofJudges Dyk, Haldane Robert Mayer, and Reyna.
Writing for the panel, Judge Dyk addressed the law of issue
exhaustion separately regarding Mr. Scott's apparent failure to raise
his objection before the Veterans Court and the Board."
Synthesizing the Federal Circuit's precedents in each context, Judge
Dyk provided the following conclusion:
[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances not apparent here, we think
it is appropriate for the Board and the Veterans Court to address only
those procedural arguments specifically raised by the veteran, though
at the same time giving the veteran's pleadings a liberal construction.
In short, we hold that the Board's obligation to read filings in a
liberal manner does not require the Board or the Veterans Court
to search the record and address procedural arguments when the
veteran fails to raise them before the Board. Under the balancing
test articulated in Maggitt [v. West,7 7] the VA's institutional interests
in addressing the hearing issue early in the case outweigh Scott's
interests in the Veterans Court's adjudication of the issue.78




74. Id. The panel opinion noted that "Scott again appealed to the Board via a re-
certification of appeal form which checked 'YES' in answer to 'WAS HEARING
REQUESTED?,"' id., but the Federal Circuit did not explain why that was insufficient
to raise the hearing issue. Id. at 1381.
75. Id. at 1377.
76. Id. at 1376, 1381.
77. 202 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
78. Scott, 789 F.3d at 1381 (citing Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377).
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE BENEFITS ELIGIBILITY DECISIONS
The few precedential opinions addressing claimants' rights to
substantive benefits tackled straightforward issues in equally
straightforward fashion.
In Mulder v. McDonald," the Federal Circuit considered the VA's
statutory obligation to reduce payment of benefits awards to veterans
during periods of incarceration pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1).so
Specifically, the court was asked to determine whether a period of
incarceration due to an inability to post bail post-conviction but pre-
sentencing should be treated as incarceration "for conviction of a
felony."' A panel of the Federal Circuit comprised ofJudges Pauline
Newman, Kathleen M. O'Malley, and Raymond T. Chen affirmed the
Veterans Court's conclusion that the critical time point is when a
felony conviction is entered.8
Mr. Mulder argued on appeal that "the necessary causal link
between his incarceration and felony conviction was not present until
he was actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding sixty
days."83 Writing for the Federal Circuit, Judge Chen thus focused on
the construction of the statutory language "incarcerated ... for
conviction of a felony."84 To that end, Judge Chen referred to the
Federal Circuit's 2014 decision in Wilson v. Gibson,5 in which the
court addressed a related argument; namely, whether the relevant
timing consideration is when a conviction becomes final by virtue of
exhaustion of appellate rights." Consistent with Wilson, the Federal
Circuit in Mulder "decline [d] to equate the word 'sentencing' with
the statutory term 'conviction'"" and concluded that " [t] he statutory
language does not require that the conviction be the sole reason that
the individual is incarcerated." 8
In Dixon v. McDonald," a Federal Circuit panel comprised ofJudges
Newman, Dyk, and Reyna held in a very brief opinion that "absent
notice to the VA of the veteran's legal obligation, the VA is not liable
79. 805 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
80. Id. at 1343.
81. Id. at 1346 (emphasis omitted).
82. Id. at 1343, 1349.
83. Id. at 1346.
84. Id.
85. 753 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
86. Id. at 1366-68. The Federal Circuit's decision in Wilson is discussed in
Moshiashwili, supra note 23, at 1049-50.
87. Mulder, 805 F.3d at 1346.
88. Id. at 1346-48.
89. 778 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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for such obligation after the veteran's death.""0 This broad issue arose
in Dixon in the specific context of a claim for retroactive garnishment of
benefits payments pursuant to an Order of Support." The Veterans
Court held, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, "that 42 U.S.C. § 659(i) (5)
requires that a garnishment order or similar legal process be served on
the VA, in order for the VA to garnish veteran's payments."9
In Haynes v. McDonald," a Federal Circuit panel comprised of
Judges Newman, O'Malley, and Wallach held in a very brief opinion
that a surviving spouse must, in fact, have been a spouse at the time of
the veteran's death." "Section 3.50(b)," the panel explained, "defines the
'surviving spouse' as someone 'who was the spouse of the veteran at the
time of the veteran's death,' tracking [38 U.S.C. § 101(3)]. No exception
to this clear statutory mandate and regulation is indicated."9
In Moffitt v. McDonald," a Federal Circuit panel comprised of
Judges Lourie, Kimberly A. Moore, and O'Malley held-consistent
with the Federal Circuit's decision in Kernea v. Shinseki"9 -that a
surviving spouse may not rely on a "hypothetical entitlement" theory
to establish eligibility for enhanced dependency and indemnity
compensation benefits and that the VA was permitted to give
retroactive effect to the regulation that established that policy."
V. DIRECT REVIEW OF VA REGULATIONS
The Federal Circuit heard only one direct petition under 38 U.S.C.§ 502 in 2015." In McKinney v. McDonald,100 a panel comprised of
Judges O'Malley and Wallach, and District Judge Gilstrap considered
a petition for review of the effective date of a regulation"o' that
provides a presumption of herbicide exposure for certain veterans
90. Id. at 1340-41.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. 785 F.3d 614 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
94. Id. at 614, 616. Judge Newman authored the opinions for the Federal Circuit
in both Dixon, discussed above, and Haynes.
95. Id. at 616.
96. 776 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
97. 724 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
98. Moffitt, 776 F.3d at 1364-69.
99. As discussed above, the Federal Circuit determined in Wingard v. McDonald
that it did not have jurisdiction to treat an appeal from a dismissal by the Veterans
Court of an appeal regarding the contents of the Ratings Schedule as if it were a§ 502 appeal. 779 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
100. 796 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
101. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (6) (iv) (2011).
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who served in units that operated in or near certain areas of the
Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) during the Vietnam era. 0 2
The challenged regulation finds its genesis in the Veterans Benefits
Act of 2003,1o3 which authorized benefits for certain children with
spina bifida born to veterans who were exposed to herbicides near
the Korean DMZ.104 Thereafter, the VA determined that such
veterans' presumptive exposure should rationally be established for
purposes both of their children's benefits-as specified by the 2003
Act-and of their own personal claims for benefits.1o' The Veterans
Benefits Administration thus revised its Adjudication Procedure
Manual to provide for such a presumption.'o
In 2009, the VA proposed the challenged regulation,o' which was
finalized and published in 2011.' The final rule extended the
period of time of service for which the presumption would be
established and set an effective date thirty days after publication of
the final rule in the Federal Register.'o
Mr. McKinney and several veterans service organizations
challenged the effective date of the regulation because it created the
peculiar result that the same claimant may be awarded service connection
for a current disability based on the regulation's presumption for the
period from 2011 onward, but may be denied service connection for the
same disability prior to 2011 for lack of evidence. "o
Writing for the Federal Circuit, Judge O'Malley concluded that
the challenged regulation did not reflect an arbitrary or capricious
act by the VA."' Rather, Judge O'Malley noted, its prospective
application is consistent with the VA's treatment of other
liberalizing statutes and regulations.'12
CONCLUSION
In sum, the year 2015 was a sparse year for veterans law at the
Federal Circuit. Although it can be hoped that the continued
102. McKinney, 796 F.3d at 1378.
103. 38 U.S.C. § 1821 (2012).
104. McKinney, 796 F.3d at 1379.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1379-80.
108. Id. at 1380.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1381-83.
111. Id. at 1384-86.
112. Id. at 1384-85.
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decrease in the number of precedential opinions issued by the
Federal Circuit in this area is attributable to improved operations at
the VA and effective review by the Veterans Court, it remains
distressing that so few veterans appeals are decided on the merits and
that the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional limitations continue to
impose roadblocks to veterans' all-too-lengthy battles for benefits.

